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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
battery, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City
Code § 11-08-020.

This Court invokes jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the law student who tried the case had the

authority to prosecute a criminal misdemeanor trial without
complying with Rule 11-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

This is an issue of law and will be reviewed

under the correction of error standard affording no deference to
the trial court.

Adoption of W, 904 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995) (standard of review on jurisdictional issues).
Further, appellant contends that it was plain error to permit the
law student to prosecute without authority.

To establish plain

error, appellant must show (1) an error exists, (2) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful.

State v. Hall,

946 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 11-301. Law student assistance.
Intent.
services.

To ensure the provision of competent legal

To increase the opportunity of law students to have
first-hand contact with the legal system and participate
directly in the court process.

1

Applicability. This rule shall apply to the bar, the
judiciary and to law students.
Statement of the Rule. Subject to the inherent power of
each judge to have direct control of the proceedings in
court and the conduct of attorneys and others who appear
before the judge, the courts of this state are authorized to
allow law students to participate in matters pending before
them, provided:
(A) The student's participation is limited to civil and
misdemeanor cases;
(B) The student has completed legal studies amounting to
at least four (4) semesters or the equivalent if the school
is not on a semester basis;
(C) The student's participation is under the direct and
immediate personal supervision and in the presence of a
resident attorney admitted to practice law before the court,
except the presence of a resident attorney shall not be
required at default divorce proceedings which are not
contested and where the appearing party is represented by a
non-profit public service legal agency;
(D) The student's participation is agreed to by written
stipulation of counsel for all parties to the action and
filed in the case file;
(E) The student does not receive any compensation or
remuneration of any kind from the client on whose behalf the
services are rendered.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928. Attorney duties--Deputy public
prosecutor
In cities with a city attorney, the city attorney may
prosecute violations of city ordinances, and under state
law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring within the
boundaries of the municipality and has the same powers in
respect to violations as are exercised by a county attorney
or district attorney, except that a city attorney's
authority to grant immunity shall be limited to granting
transactional immunity for violations of city ordinances,
and under state law, infractions, and misdemeanors occurring
within the boundaries of the municipality.
The city
attorney shall represent the interests of the state or the
municipality in the appeal of any matter prosecuted in any
trial court by the city attorney.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Wade dinger was convicted of battery, a Class B
Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-020.
The case was tried without a jury.

The trial court sentenced

dinger to a term of probation of one year which included
domestic violence counseling and twenty-five hours of community
service.

(R. 10)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

During a bench trial on November 18, 1997, Wade dinger was
convicted of battery under the Salt Lake City Code.

The Salt

Lake City Prosecutor's Office was the prosecuting agency.

(Trial

Transcript of 11-18-97 at 3, 34) [Hereinafter "Trans."]
The person who prosecuted the case was a woman named Amy
Hugie, a law student practicing under Utah's law student
assistant rule, a rule which permits qualified law students to
appear in court under the direct supervision of a supervising
attorney.

(Trans, at 3; Rule 11-301, Code of Judicial

Administration)

However, the "Appearances" page of the trial

transcript incorrectly refers to Ms. Hugie as an "Attorney at
Law."

(Trans, at 2)
When the judge called the matter for trial, she stated "I am

not sure who is going to prosecute this case."

Ms. Hugie

answered that she would be prosecuting, with the court's
permission.

The judge then replied, "under the direction of

3

(inaudible)."

(R. 3)

That short discussion was the extent of

any attempt to comply with Rule 11-301.
In the Index of Proceedings prepared by the district court,
which was made part of the record but is not identified by a
record number, the entry on November 18, 1997, shows that Mike
Zabriskie represented the city.

Mr. Zabriskie's name is never

mentioned in the trial transcript nor does he make an appearance
of counsel.

There is no record evidence that Mr. Zabriskie was

in the courtroom during the trial and supervising Ms. Hugie.
Further, the record does not contain a written stipulation,
signed by both parties, permitting Ms. Hugie to proceed on behalf
of Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The bench trial was prosecuted by a law student practicing
under Rule 11-301 of the Code of Judicial Administration.

The

court file contains no written stipulation, signed by both
parties, permitting the law student to participate in court.
Further, there is no record evidence that the law student was
supervised during trial by a supervising attorney who, under the
explicit language of the rule, is required to be present in the
courtroom.

dinger was convicted of the charged offense.

Because the law student had no authority to prosecute the case
the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting the trial
to go forward.

Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed.

4

ARGUMENT
Failure to Comply with Rule 11-3 01 rendered the
conviction null and void since the law student who
tried the case lacked the authority to prosecute.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by authorizing a
student intern to conduct dinger's bench trial without requiring
compliance with the law student assistance rule, Rule 11-301 of
the Code of Judicial Administration.

Accordingly, dinger's

conviction cannot stand since the parties never agreed by written
stipulation to permit the student to prosecute the case, and the
record evidence does not indicate that the prosecuting attorney
was actually in the courtroom and supervising the student intern.
The statutory authority for a city attorney to prosecute the
violation of city ordinances is found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3928 (1996).

A law student intern who meets the criteria of Rule

11-301 is permitted to assist in a criminal misdemeanor case as
an arm of the city attorney's office.

dinger argues that if the

criteria of Rule 11-301 is not met, then the law student who
prosecuted him had no authority to do so, and the conviction
cannot stand.1 Rule 11-301 provides in pertinent part as follows:
1

Only one Utah case has reviewed Rule 11-301. In State v.
Glorioso, 806 P.2d 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the state moved to
permit a law student to argue the appeal from a conviction for a
second degree felony. The court denied the motion, concluding
that it had no authority to permit the law student to argue since
a law student's participation under the rule is limited to civil
and misdemeanor cases. Id. The difference between Glorioso and
the circumstances presented in this appeal is that in Glorioso
compliance with the rule would never have been possible. In this
case, compliance may have been possible but was never
5

Intent.
services.

To ensure the provision of competent legal

To increase the opportunity of law students to have
first-hand contact with the legal system and participate
directly in the court process.
Applicability. This rule shall apply to the bar, the
judiciary and to law students.
Statement of the Rule. Subject to the inherent power of
each judge to have direct control of the proceedings in
court and the conduct of attorneys and others who appear
before the judge, the courts of this state are authorized to
allow law students to participate in matters pending before
them, provided:
(A) The student's participation is limited to civil and
misdemeanor cases;
(B) The student has completed legal studies amounting to
at least four (4) semesters or the equivalent if the school
is not on a semester basis;
(C) The student's participation is under the direct and
immediate personal supervision and in the presence of a
resident attorney admitted to practice law before the court,
except the presence of a resident attorney shall not be
required at default divorce proceedings which are not
contested and where the appearing party is represented by a
non-profit public service legal agency;
(D) The student's participation is agreed to by written
stipulation of counsel for all parties to the action and
filed in the case file;

Several aspects of the rule are relevant to this appeal.
First, the rule makes no distinction between defense-oriented and
prosecution-oriented activities.

The mandate of the rule applies

accomplished, thereby corrupting the legitimacy of the
conviction. The case was not tried by a person with
prosecutorial authority.
6

whether a law student is an intern for the prosecution or the
defense.

Second, under the rule direct and immediate supervision

by a supervising attorney is required and the supervising
attorney must be present in court with the law student.
all

Finally,

parties to the action must agree by written stipulation to

the student's participation and the stipulation must be filed in
the record.

In this case, the second and third aspects noted

above were never complied with and, therefore, pursuant to
section 10-3-98, the law student had no authority to prosecute
the case as a deputy or agent of the city attorney's office.
Hence, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting
the law student to proceed.
1.

Lack of authority to prosecute.

Since this issue involves the lack of authority to prosecute
because of the failure to comply with Rule 11-301, the situation
is analogous to the appointment of a special prosecutor pursuant
to a statute or constitutional provision.

For example, in Utah

"the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro
tempore."

Utah Constitution, Article VIII, § 1 6 .

So long as the

appointment of a lawyer outside the prosecuting attorney's office
is properly made pursuant to law, the special prosecutor has the
authority to go forward with the case and the court has
jurisdiction to hear it.

Of course, this presumes that the

lawyer appointed is in fact a member of the bar in good standing.

7

However, in State v. Hollenbeck, 814 P.2d 143, 145 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991), the defendant's conviction for criminal sexual
penetration was reversed because the special prosecutor was not
appointed under the specific procedures outlined by statute.

In

Hollenbeck, an attorney working for the Medicaid Providers Fraud
Control Unit, an office or agency funded by the New Mexico
legislature, prosecuted a sexual penetration case for a local
district attorney.

The appellate court held that under

applicable statute and the circumstances of the case, the special
prosecuting attorney did not have the authority to prosecute and
thus the trial court lacked jurisdiction.

Under the statute,

special assistants could be appointed only for ethical reasons or
other good cause. Id.

Noting first that "we do not presume the

legislature enacted a useless statute," Id., the court observed
that "[t]he rationale for requiring authorization for prosecution
is to avoid prosecution by persons who are not held accountable
or subject to the oath of office."

See also State v. Baca, 688

P.2d 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding in criminal case court
obtains no jurisdiction over an action brought without authority
and that if person who has no authority to prosecute does
prosecute, court will lack jurisdiction).
The issue of authority to prosecute under a special
prosecutor appointment was further explored by the Nevada Supreme
Court in Attorney General v. District Court, 844 P.2d 124 (Nev.
1992).

That case held that the trial court had exceeded its
8

jurisdiction when, after disqualifying the district attorney's
office on a murder case, it assigned the case to the attorney
general.

Under Nevada law, the attorney general does not have

the statutory authority to act as special prosecutor.
125.

Id. at

See also State v. Pittman, 829 S.W.2d 897, 899-900 (Tex.

Ct. App. 1992) (holding assistant

county attorney lacked

statutory authority to bring appeal in criminal matter on behalf
of state).

Hence, the Nevada case articulates three principles.

First, a lawyer has no authority to prosecute a case unless such
authority stems directly from some statute, rule, or
constitutional provision.

Second, a trial judge exceeds his or

her jurisdiction by changing the rules from which the authority
to prosecute derives.

Third, if a trial judge permits

prosecution by a person not authorized to prosecute, the trial
court loses jurisdiction of the matter.
The concept of authority to prosecute not only touches the
jurisdictional issue, but is also significant because authority
to prosecute involves important public responsibilities and
political accountability for the conduct of the prosecuting
agency.

Accordingly, one court has recognized how essential it

is for a prosecuting agency to maintain control over a criminal
prosecution.

Thus, in the State of Texas

[a] district attorney may appoint any duly licensed
attorney to assist him in prosecuting a criminal case
"as long as the district or county attorney does not
relinquish control of or responsibility for such
prosecution. Control over the prosecution logically
9

includes the presence of the district or county
attorney or an assistant district or assistant county
attorney, respectively, in the courtroom during all
phases of the trial."
Gaitan v. State, 905 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995),
quoting State ex re. Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921, 932-33 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994) (Maloney, J., concurring).
2.

Failure to comply with Rule 11-301.

By failing to make either strict or substantial compliance
with the law student assistance rule, the student intern had no
authority to prosecute the case and dinger's conviction must be
vacated.

The court in Cheatham v. State, 364 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla.

Ct. App. 1978), reversed a conviction for aggravated assault
because the defendant had not been informed that the person
representing him was a legal intern nor was the intern adequately
supervised by an attorney as required under Florida law.

See

also Matter of Moore, 380 N.E.2d 917, 920 (111. 1978) (holding no
compliance with Illinois rule permitting law students to
practice; civil judgment vacated because there was no written
consent form in the record and respondent was not aware he was
represented by a law student); City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 667
P.2d 630, 633 (Wash 1983) (law student who is authorized to
practice only under certain conditions may be considered counsel
only when he or she complies with those conditions); Benbow v.
State, 614 So.2d 398, 403 (Miss. 1993) (requiring full compliance
with Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-207, which specifies the conditions

10

under which law students may practice; conviction reversed on
Sixth Amendment grounds).
Even if only substantial compliance with Rule 11-301 is
required, the parameters of substantial compliance must still be
defined.

State v. Daniels, 346 So.2d 672 (La. 1977), provides a

good example of substantial compliance with a law student
practice rule.

In Daniels, the supervising defense attorney in a

criminal case obtained the defendant's written consent to be
represented by law students and the consent form was then filed
in the record.

Later, however, another supervising attorney was

later substituted for the original supervising attorney, and the
defendant's consent was obtained orally on the record.

The

Daniels court rejected defendant's claim that this violated the
Louisiana rule permitting law students to participate in trial
work, and held that there was substantial compliance with the
rule.

Id. at 674.
The facts in dinger's appeal simply do not demonstrate

substantial compliance with Rule 11-301, and therefore the law
student had no authority to prosecute under section 10-3-928.
is undisputed that the record does not contain a stipulation
signed by both parties agreeing to the participation of the law
student.

Next, a brief discussion on the record just prior to

trial identifies the parties and their representatives:
THE COURT: Salt Lake City v. Wade Clinger. Are we
ready?
MR. LARSEN: We are, your honor, Larry Larsen for Mr.
11

It

dinger.
THE COURT: Thank You. Mr. Clinger is present. . . .
and I am not sure who is going to prosecute the case. Let's
get appearances.
MS. HUGIE: Amy Hugie, Your Honor, I will be
prosecuting this case
Okay.
THE COURT
With
your permission.
MS. HUGIE
Okay,
so (inaudible)
THE COURT
For
the
prosecution.
MS. HUGIE
Under
the
direction of (inaudible)
THE COURT
(Transcript of November 18, 1997 at 3)

In addition, page 2 of

the transcript lists the appearances and refers only to Amy Hugie
as representing the city.

However, in the Index of Proceedings

prepared by district court, which was made part of the record but
is not identified by a record number, the entry on November 18,
1997, shows that Mike Zabriskie represented the city.

Mr.

Zabriskie's name is never mentioned in the trial transcript nor
does he make an appearance.

Based on the discussion quoted

above, an the transcript taken in its entirety, it does not
appear that Mr. Zabriskie was even in the courtroom when the
judge called the case and asked for appearances.

Accordingly,

there was a complete failure to comply with the requirements of
Rule 11-301 and Ms. Hugie had no legal authority to prosecute the
case.

The conviction cannot stand since it does not flow

directly from the authority vested in city prosecutors as set
forth in section 10-3-928.

The trial court exceeded its

jurisdiction by proceeding without a written stipulation signed
by both parties and in the absence of a city prosecutor licensed
to practice law in Utah.
12

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Clinger
requests this Court to reverse the judgment of conviction.
DATED this

U

day of September,_JL998.

LONI F. DeLAND
MICHAEL R. SIKORA
Lawyers for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant was mailed or hand-delivered on the _f//£- day
of September, 1998, to:
Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East, Suite 125
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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28
31

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

November 18, 1997

1

THE COURT:

2
3

Are we ready?
MR. LARSEN:

4
5

Salt Lake City vs. Wade Clinger.

We are, Your Honor, Larry Larsen

for Mr. Clinger.
THE COURT:

6

Thank you.

Mr. Clinger is

7

present.

Do you have a copy of the Information <alleging

8

one count of battery, unlawful force or force or violence

9

upon the person of another at 418 Edith Avenue on December

10

11 of '96, and I am not sure who is going to prosecute the

11

case.

Let's get appearances.
MS. HUGIE:

12
13

Amy Hugie, Your Honor, I will be

prosecuting the case.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MS. HUGIE:

With your permission.

16

THE COURT:

Okay, so (inaudible)

17

MS. HUGIE:

For the prosecution.

18

THE COURT:

Under the direction of

19

(inaudible).

Do you have a copy of the information, Mr.

20

Larsen, and I indicated to you what the charges are.

21

assume you are prepared to go ahead?

22

MR. LARSEN:

23

THE COURT:

Is the City prepared?

24

MS. HUGIE:

Yes, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

I

I am prepared.

Go ahead, Ms. Hugie, then,
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September 23, 1997
Tape 1967 Count 430

Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was
present without counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the
city. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. A bench trial was set
for November 18, 1997.

November 18, 1997
Tape 2369 Count 1750

Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was
present with counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the city.
Susan Clinger was sworn and testified on behalf of the city. City rests.
The defendant was sworn and testified. The defendant rests. The court
heard closing arguments. The court finds the defendant guilty as
charged. The defendant was sentenced to 180 days jail suspended and a
$1,850.00 fine suspended. The defendant is to complete 25 hours of
community service. The defendant is on 12 months good behavior
probation. A review hearing is set for November 25, 1997.

November 25, 1997
Tape 2474

Honorable Sheila K. McCleve was presiding. The defendant was
present without counsel. Mike Zabriskie was present on behalf of the
city. The defendant requested a later review date because he will be out
of the country. The review hearing was continued to February 3, 1998.

